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SEPARATE STATUTORY TREATMENT OF THE
CLOSE CORPORATION IN CALIFORNIA:
PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS
A bill recently passed by the California Legislature will effect a
thorough revision of California's General Corporation Law.' A signifi-
cant portion of that bill devotes itself to the problems of the close cor-
poration,2 long considered the stepchild of American corporation law.
Over the last thirty to forty years, numerous writers have deplored the
plight under existing corporation laws of small businesses, organized
essentially for the employment of their shareholders.3 The structure
forced upon those desiring limited liability is, they say, uselessly de-
manding and archaic.4
California, in its revision of the Corporation Law, gives recogni-
tion to this insistent argument for change by allowing increased flexi-
bility to the participants in a statutorily defined close corporation. The
revision, however, goes no further than the advances made by some
of California's sister states,5 and in many respects falls short of the com-
prehensive statutory treatment of the close corporation presented by
the most innovative states.6 Nevertheless, by enacting the bill into law,
1. A.B. 376 (1975).
2. Id. §§ 158, 186, 202(a), 204(a), 300, 418, 421, 705(e) (5), 706(a), 1111,
1201(e), 1800.
3. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAw AND PRAcTicE (2d ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as O'NEAL]; Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation: The
Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation]; Hetherington, Special Character-
istics Problems and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.R. 1; Kessler,
The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U.
Cm. L. REV. 696 (1960); Oppenheim, The Close Corporation in California: Necessity
of Separate Statutory Treatment, 12 HASNGS L.J. 227 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Oppenheim]; Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law", 28 CORNELL L.
REV. 313 (1943); Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corpora-
tion, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 700 (1958).
4. See, e.g., 1 ONEAL, supra note 3, at §§ 1.12, 1.13, ,l.13a; Bradley, Toward
a More Perfect Close Corporation, supra note 3, at 1145; Oppenbeirn, supra note 3, at
228.
5. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 13-A, §§ 102(5), 407(5), 607(1), 701
(Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-24, -73, -125(a) (1975); S.C. CoDB ANN. §§ 12-
16.15, -16.22, -22.15 (Supp. 1974).
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 351-58 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 23,
§§ 100-11 (1957); TEx. Bus. CoRp. AcT ANN., arts. 2.30-1 to -5 (Supp. 1974).
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California has made a significant stride in the direction of increased
statutory recognition of the needs of small businesses.
The bill is the product of extensive research and discussion by the
Committee on Corporations of the State Bar of California and the Cali-
fornia Assembly Select Committee on the Revision of the Corporations
Code.7 The two groups produced several drafts of the bill which were
circulated for comment and criticism to local bar representatives, pro-
fessors of corporation law, and corporation attorneys." The final draft
of the bill was then written, and on January 2, 1975, it was submitted
to the Assembly. After several amendments, the bill passed both
houses of the legislature, and was signed by the governor on September
12, 1975.2 The new law will not become effective until January 1,
1977, and in the interim, a committee will be appointed to review, criti-
cize and propose amendments to improve the measure.10
This comment will attempt to analyze the probable effect of the
new law on small business electing to become close corporations under
the terms of the measure. This analysis will include an attempt to de-
fine the nature of a close corporation, a brief review of its historical
treatment under general corporation law, a discussion of the mechanics
of the California bill as they relate to close corporations, and finally
a consideration of the effectiveness of those mechanics in light of the
most common problems encountered by the close corporation: arrang-
ing the management of its affairs, restricting the transfer of its stock,
agreeing on shareholder votes, and meeting attempts under the alter
ego doctrine to hold the shareholders personally liable for the debts
of the corporation.
What is a Close Corporation?
A close corporation is typically a small business. For example,
it commonly arises when the partners actively engaged in the business
of a partnership incorporate that partnership." A close corporation
is often a family concern in which relatives hold shares and actively
participate in the running of the business. 12 In addition, a sole proprie-
7. 1 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS, ExPosURE
DRAFT: GENERAL CORPORATION LAW (1974).
8. Id. at 1-4.
9. ASSEMBLY DAILY HISTORY, 1975-76 Reg. Sess., Sept. 19, 1975. The bill was
amended on April 1, 1975, May 1, 1975, May 21, 1975, August 5, 1975, August 19,
1975, and September 2, 1975. Id.
10. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
11. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 I1. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964); Seitz v. Mi-
chels, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921).
12. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 111. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
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tor's incorporation of his business usually makes that business a close
corporation.
18
While it is easy to give examples of what can constitute a close
corporation, it is more difficult to attempt to isolate the characteristics
peculiar to a close corporation. Numerous attempts have been made,
not all of them successful. 4 Nevertheless, it can be said with safety
that a close corporation usually exhibits most of the following traits:
1) It is a corporation.
2) It has few shareholders, often fewer than ten.
3) Its shareholders know each other.
4) Its shareholders are active in the management of the
business.
5) Its shareholders constitute the board of directors.
6) Its shares are not freely transferable.
7) Its shares do not have a general market.' 5
The mere enumeration of these traits suggests many of the prob-
lems of close corporations under general corporation law. The general
corporation statutes contemplate a hierarchy within the corporation
consisting of shareholders, directors, and management. 6 In the close
corporation the participants commonly take on two or three of these
roles and give little regard to the significance each holds. The general
corporation statutes provide for free transferability of shares on the as-
sumption that this flexibility will encourage the investment of risk capi-
tal in businesses. The close corporation, however, looks to those active
in its operation for equity investment and uses shares to represent each
individual's stake in the business. Free transferability of the shares in
a close corporation would prove more a disruptive threat to business
than an aid in the attraction of risk capital.'
While the general corporation statutes presume an autonomous
board of directors solely responsible for running the business of the cor-
13. See, e.g., McCombs v. Rudman, 197 Cal. App. 2d 46, 17 Cal. Rptr. 351
(1961).
14. See, e.g., 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.07; Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 228;
Tennery, Potential of the Close Corporation: A Question of Economic Validity, 14
How. L.J. 241 (1968); Wolens, A Round Peg-A Square Hole: The Close Corporation
and the Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 811 (1968). The New York Law Revision Commission gave
up its attempt and concluded that there was no adequate way to define a close corpora-
tion. 1948 N.Y. LAw Rav. COMM'N REP. 386.
15. See 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.07; Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 227.
16. N. LAT=N, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1971) § 69 [hereinafter cited
as LATriN].
17. See Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d 828, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1964). See also notes 142-147 & accompanying text infra.
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poration, the function of the board in a close corporation is generally
made irrelevant by the identity of shareholders, directors, and officers,
and the close corporation participants' desire for longevity of employ-
ment can lead to agreements that sterilize the function of the board
of directors.' 8 The general corporation statutes contemplate a corpo-
rate democracy in which the vote of the majority of shares prevails.
This approach is felt to lead to efficiency and fairness in deciding the
long range policies of the corporation. In the close corporation, how-
ever, disputes among the participants may reverberate throughout the
organization,"9 and the majority vote can lock into the corporation
shareholders who disagree with the policies of the majority."°
History of the Treatment of Close Corporations
Given the disparity between the needs and desires of the parti-
cipants in a close corporation and the function served by the corporate
model traditionally presented in corporation statutes, it is not surprising
that close corporation participants have made efforts to circumvent the
strictures of the corporation laws and that the courts as interpreters of
the same laws have often thwarted these schemes. Historically, such
efforts have included voting trust agreements, 2 irrevocable proxies,22
vote pooling agreements by both shareholders and directors,2 long-
term employment contracts, 24 agreements restricting action by the
board of directors, 25 certain share transfer restrictions, 26 and high
quorum and high vote requirements for shareholders' and directors'
meetings.17  The courts in this country at one time or another have
invalidated them all, giving such reasons as the preservation of corpo-
rate democracy,28 inability under the law to separate voting rights in
18. See notes 86-103 & accompanying text infra.
19. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910); McQuade
v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
20. See 2 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 9.02.
21. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (Ch. 1956),
modified, 36 Del. Ch. 102, 125 A.2d 588 (Ch. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Del.
Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
22. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Yankee Mariner Corp., 106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 455, 235
P.2d 234 (1951).
23. See, e.g., Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Odman v. Oleson,
319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946).
24. See, e.g., Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946); McQuade v.
Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
25. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910).
26. See, e.g., Rafe v. Hindin, 23 N.Y.2d 759, 296 N.Y.S.2d 955, 244 N.E.2d 469
(1968).
27. See, e.g., Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
28. Id. at 118-19, 60 N.E.2d at 831.
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stock from stock ownership,2 9 and the preservation of the board of di-
rectors as the management body of the corporation. 30
The hostility shown in these opinions toward close corporation
agreements is surprising when it is considered that the participants in
the close corporations were commonly the only ones who would have
gained or lost by these arrangements. State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson
3'
illustrates well the common judicial attitude. In that case, the share-
holders of a small corporation agreed that the board members should
sit until they died, resigned, or became incapacitated. The decision
invalidated this arrangement because it conflicted with the statutory re-
quirement that the board be elected each year. 32 The court ration-
alized its decision on the ground that the state made certain privileges
available to corporations in return for the observance by these corpora-
tions of the statutorily prescribed formalities, and it concluded that to
allow the parties in this case to alter the prescribed form by agreement
"would seem to accord to the organizers of the corporation greater
power than the sovereign, by whose will alone it exists and enjoys its
privileges and immunities.
' s3
One writer has characterized the attitude taken in decisions such
as the preceding one as exhibiting an animistic belief that the corporate
personality could be created and preserved only by the observance of
certain statutorily prescribed rituals.34 Nevertheless, behind the articu-
lated rationales in these cases, there appear to have been legitimate
concerns motivating the courts. If substantial variance from the corpo-
rate norm were allowed, large publicly held corporations could be
manipulated in form so as to deprive minority shareholders of any say
in the management of the business, and to defraud unsuspecting inves-
tors.
3 5
Of course, this concern for the protection of unwitting parties
seems less compelling in the context of a close corporation whose
shareholders have all assented to the arrangement under which they
will participate. The California Supreme Court early recognized this
29. Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908).
30. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910).
31. 31 Ind. App. 34, 67 N.E. 207 (1903).
32. Id. at 44, 67 N.E. at 210.
33. Id. at 42, 67 N.E. at 209.
34. Kessler, With Limited Liability for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation?,
36 FoRDiAm L. REV. 235 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kessler, Partnership Corporation].
35. See 1. H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 38
(4th ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE & STERLING]; Dodd, Amendment of
Corporate Articles Under the New Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 U. GIN. L. REv.
129 (1930).
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distinction when, in Vanucci v. Pedrini,6 the court upheld as a valid
agreement among a corporation's shareholders a bylaw prohibiting sale
of their stock to outsiders unless a prior offer had been made to the
corporation and its shareholders. In sanctioning the agreement the
court quoted with approval a New Jersey decision which stated:
In this court where the intent of the parties is the thing sought to be
enforced, every effort should be made to hold men to agreements
into which they have voluntarily entered, where the same are not
obnoxious to any law or policy. . . . It is their business and their
money which is involved. It is by their efforts that success is at-
tained if attained at all.37
Recent years have revealed a greater willingness by courts to
recognize the peculiar needs of close corporations and to distinguish
between close corporations and other corporations in applying general
corporate law.38 Coupled with statutory changes in many states, 39 this
new judicial attitude has created a friendlier atmosphere for close cor-
porations. Nevertheless, in states with the traditional statutory frame-
work that fails to distinguish between close corporations and other cor-
porations, courts friendly to close corporations have been forced to
carve out exceptions and twist statutory language in order to find room
for close corporation arrangements.4 ° These manipulations in turn
have left questionable ambiguities in the law in a place where certainty
is the most desired quality.4
The problem of the close corporation, then, has become in large
part the problem with which this discussion began: how to define the
close corporation and distinguish it from other business corporations.
36. 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932).
37. Id. at 144-45, 17 P.2d at 708 quoting Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597,
602, 124 A. 118, 120 (1924).
38. See, e.g., Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967); Galler v. Galler,
32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
39. Space does not permit citation of all statutes relevant to close corporations.
For examples of some of the better recent legislation, see statutes cited notes 5 & 6 supra.
40. See, e.g., Peck v. Horst, 175 Kan. 479, 264 P.2d 888 (1953) (agreement vio-
lating statutes regulating the internal affairs of the corporation upheld on ground of
waiver of statutory protection by shareholders party to the agreement); Clark v. Dodge,
269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) ("slight deviations" from corporate norms per-
mitted). See also Galler v. Galler, 32 ll. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964) in which the
court discussed a number of Illinois decisions which upheld shareholder agreements on
practical grounds-no apparent public injury, the absence of a complaining minority in-
terest, and no prejudice to existing shareholders-even though the agreements technically
violated the Illinois Business Corporation Act.
41. An Illinois court was forced to admit that the effect of upholding shareholder
agreements which technically violated the corporations statutes "has been to inject much
doubt and uncertainty into the thinking of the bench and corporate bar of Illinois con-
cerning shareholder agreements." Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 28, 203 N.E.2d 577,
584 (1964).
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If its problems are different, then its statutory treatment should be dif-
ferent, and if its statutory treatment is to be different, the close corpo-
ration must be defined. 42  Until corporation statutes differentiate be-
tween close corporations and other corporations, the courts will con-
tinue to be forced to construct a body of exceptions for the close corpo-
ration, and the participants in close corporations will be forced to tread
cautiously lest they overstep this unclear line of judicial permissiveness.
The California Bill
Definition of a Close Corporation
The California bill is relatively straightforward in its treatment of
close corporations. Section 158, in essence, defines a close corpora-
tion as one whose shares are held by no more than ten shareholders.43
This numerical definition is patterned in part upon the Delaware Close
Corporation Act.44 Delaware adds, however, that the stock of the cor-
poration must also be subject to restrictions on transfer, and that no
public offering as defined under the 1933 Federal Securities Act can
be made of the stock.45 California does not include these additional
requirements. While a mere numerical limit on the number of share-
holders does not begin to describe the essence of a close corporation,
it does reflect the recognition that a close corporation will not have
many shareholders, and it does ensure some protection to the partici-
pants by making it more likely that they will have a large enough stake
in the corporation to protect themselves in any bargaining.
4
42. One commentator emphasizes the importance of a definition of a close corpo-
ration which is keyed to the bargaining power of the participants, since the consequence
of close corporation status, at least under the Delaware act, is the replacement of the pro-
tection afforded the shareholders by board and shareholder votes with the bargained
agreement of the parties. Comment, Delaware's Close Corporation Statute, 63 Nw. U.L.
RaV. 230, 236 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Delaware's Close Corporation Statute].
43. A.B. 376 § 158 (1975). This definition results from the requirements in sec-
tion 158 that the articles of a close corporation must place a limit on the number of
its shareholders, not to exceed ten, and that an effective transfer of the stock that causes
the corporation to have more shareholders than allowed by the articles will also cause
the corporation to forfeit close corporation status. Id. For a discussion of when a
transfer causing there to be more shareholders than the limit in the articles will be effec-
tive and when it will not, see notes 68-75 & accompanying text infra.
44. The Delaware statute specifies that to qualify under Delaware's close corpora-
tion act, the corporation's stock cannot be held by more than 30 shareholders. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 342(a)(1) (1974).
45. Id. § 342(a)(2)-(3). One writer indicates that the combination of a limit
on the number of shareholders in a close corporation and restrictions on the transfer
of stock is a desirable approach because it makes the corporation the equivalent of part-
nership as far as the substitution of new members is concerned. Kessler, Partnership
Corporation, supra note 34, at 255-56.
46. See Delaware's Close Corporation Statute, supra note 42, at 245.
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The bill allows for the aggregation of stock holdings for purposes
of satisfying the test that the corporation have no more than ten share-
holders. Thus, husband and wife both holding shares in the corpora-
tion are treated as one shareholder regardless of how they hold their
stock.47 A trust, partnership, corporation or business association is also
treated as one shareholder regardless of how many beneficiaries, trus-
tees, partners, shareholders or members it may have.48  Such an entity
is not treated as one shareholder, however, if its primary purpose is
the acquisition or the voting of the shares of the corporation.49 If such
a purpose is shown, the holders of beneficial interests in the entity are
treated as shareholders in the corporation for purposes of determining
whether there are ten or fewer shareholders in the corporation?0
Hopefully this rule will eliminate one kind of devious action designed
to circumvent the evident statutory policy that close corporation status
be confined to corporations with a limited number of participants. One
ground on which the Delaware statute has been criticized is that it
makes easily available such devices for avoiding the numerical limit for
shareholders."
Election of Close Corporation Status
Under the new law, a corporation which satisfies the numerical
requirement of ten or fewer shareholders may elect to be treated as
a close corporation? 2  The election may be made upon the original
formation of the corporation.5 3 Presumably at this time all parties are
in accord, and will voluntarily agree to the election, though the proposal
provides no mechanism for ensuring unanimity or even majority ap-
proval at this stage.5 4 The election may also be made after the corpo-




51. Delaware's Close Corporation Statute, supra note 42, at 246.
52. A.B. 376 § 158(a) (1975).
53. Id.
54. Commonly, no one is compelled to be a shareholder in a corporation, and
therefore there is essentially no need for a statute which prevents a mere majority or
any group of fewer than all the participants from imposing close corporation status on
potential rather than actual shareholders. The arrangements into which shareholders
enter upon formation of close corporations should, however, be governed by general rules
of law relating to fraud, duress, and contracts of adhesion. For a discussion in a re-
lated area of some troubling policy issues raised by the traditional allowance of the use
of nonvoting shares in a publicly held corporation on the theory that all entering share-
holders consent to the arrangement, see 1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW & PRAC-
TICE, § 155 (1959).
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ration has been formed by an amendment to the articles. 55 If shares
of the corporation have been issued, the amendment must have the
unanimous approval of the shareholders." This requirement serves to
protect minority shareholders from being unwillingly forced into a cor-
porate structure that they did not contemplate when they originally ac-
quired their shares.57 The election is made by adding to the articles:
1) the statement: "This corporation is a close corporation;"58 2) the
words "corporation," "incorporated," or "limited," or an abbreviation
thereof in the name of the corporation;"9 and 3) a requirement that all
the issued stock of the corporation be held by not more than a specified
number of shareholders, not to exceed ten.60
Revocation of Close Corporation Election
The election to be treated as a close corporation may likewise be
revoked by an amendment of the articles. 1 Section 158(c) of the bill,
however, provides that in the case of an amendment to revoke close
corporation status, the amendment must be approved by a two-thirds
vote of each class of outstanding shares, voting and nonvoting. 2 This
requirement may be modified by a provision in the articles of the cor-
poration which authorizes revocation by a greater or smaller fraction of
the stock or which excludes any class from the vote." The articles,
however, may not provide for less than a majority vote for revoca-
tion. 4 Section 158(f) of the bill also expressly authorizes an agree-
ment among the shareholders that they will vote at a later stage to
amend the articles to revoke the provisions which give rise to close cor-
poration status. 5
55. A.B. 376 § 158(b) (1975).
56. Id.
57. See O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.14(c); Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close
Corporation, supra note 3, at 1158.
58. A.B. 376 § 158(a) (1975). This provision will largely further administrative
convenience in connection with filings in the California Secretary of State's Office. See
Adickes, A "Closed Corporation Law" for California, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1990, 2003
(1966).
59. A.B. 376 §§ 158(a), 202 (1975). This provision is apparently intended to
give some warning to creditors of a close corporation that they are dealing with a corpo-
ration and not a partnership. See FL.A. STAT. ANN. § 608.03(2)(a) (Supp. 1975).
60. A.B. 376 § 158(a) (1975). This section gives rise to the definition of a close
corporation as one with no more than ten shareholders. See note 43 & accompanying
text supra.
61. A.B. 376 § 158(c) (1975).
62. Id. Normally, an amendment would take only a majority vote of the out-
standing shares of each class entitled to vote. Id. §§ 152, 902(a).
63. Id. § 158(c).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 158(f).
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The provision allowing for revocation of the close corporation
election by a two-thirds vote has been borrowed from the Delaware
statute.66 This specification seems a needless deviation from the re-
quirement of unanimity found in the section dealing with election of
close corporation status after formation of the corporation. Allowing
a two-thirds majority to revoke the close corporation election ignores
the fact that close corporations often find it necessary to protect mi-
nority shareholders by providing them with veto powers over certain
corporate actions, and it permits such a majority to jeopardize interests
of the minority by revoking whenever it chooses.
67
Forfeiture of Close Corporation Status
In contrast to the perhaps overeasy ability to revoke the close cor-
poration election is the difficulty under the new law of effecting invol-
untary forfeiture of close corporation status. As mentioned earlier, the
only requirement for election of close corporation status is that the cor-
poration have no more than ten shareholders.6 The transfer of shares
to an eleventh shareholder, however, does not normally cause the close
corporation to lose its status as a close corporation. Instead, the trans-
fer to the eleventh holder is void if notification to that effect has been
placed on the stock certificates. 69  This approach avoids much of the
complication of the Delaware statute, which enumerates several condi-
tions to continuing status as a close corporation, allows them to be easily
broken, and then, of necessity, establishes elaborate emergency pro-
cedures to save the close corporation.7"
Moreover, the provision that shares held by a trust, partnership,
corporation or other business association, except one with the primary
purpose of acquiring or voting the shares, are considered held by one
shareholder 7' means that changes may be made in the number of bene-
ficiaries within these entities without running the risks of exceeding the
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 346(a) (1974).
67. This is Professor Bradley's criticism of section 351 of title 8 of the Delaware
Code. Section 351, while requiring unanimous consent to an arrangement for share-
holder management of a close corporation, permits such a provision to be eliminated by
a majority vote. Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland
Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525, 534, 535 [hereinafter cited as Bradley,
A Comparative Evaluation]. The proposal perhaps confuses this provision with one al-
lowing easy dissolution of a corporation, a common desire of close corporation partici-
pants.
68. See note 43 & accompanying text supra.
69. A.B. 376 § 418(c)-(d) (1975). Section 418(c) makes mandatory the place-
ment of a notification of the restriction on transfer on the stock certificates of a close
corporation. Id. § 418(c).
70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 99 342, 345-49 (1974).
71. A.B. 376 § 158(d) (1975). See notes 48-51 & accompanying text supra.
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permissible number of shareholders and of thereby making a transfer
void.
Forfeiture of close corporation status under the California bill
takes place in only four limited situations. First, if the corporation fails
to place a notice on its stock certificate to the effect that a transfer to
an eleventh shareholder is void, the transfer to an eleventh shareholder
is effective and the corporation loses its close corporation status.72
Second, if a trust, partnership, corporation or business association
legitimately holds the stock for a primary purpose other than to circum-
vent the statute, the termination of such entity and the passing of its
stock to other parties terminates close corporation status if, as a result
of the transfer, there are more than ten shareholders in the corpora-
tion.73 Third, if a shareholder dies and his stock passes to others by
will or intestacy, close corporation status ends if such transfer causes
the corporation to have more than ten shareholders.74 Fourth, if other-
wise by operation of law the corporation acquires eleven shareholders,
the corporation is no longer a close corporation.75 Since husband and
wife are considered one shareholder, a divorce decree might cause such
a forfeiture.
Benefits of Close Corporation Status
The most beneficial effect of election to close corporation status
is that the corporation is allowed to function more flexibly in a number
of ways. One such way is that all the shareholders of a close corpora-
tion may enter into a shareholder agreement pursuant to sections 300(b)
& (c) under which they may alter the operations of the corporation
without being subject to attack on the ground that their action inter-
feres with the discretion of the board, or that they are attempting to
treat the corporation like a partnership or the shareholders like part-
ners.78  A transferee of the shares of the close corporation is bound
by the terms of the agreement if notice of the agreement is placed on
the shares and the agreement is filed with the secretary of the corpo-
ration for inspection.77  To the extent that the agreement relieves di-
rectors of their managerial duties, liability for failure to observe these
duties will be shifted to each of the shareholders who is either a party
to the agreement or a transferee bound by its terms.78
72. A.B. 376 §§ 158(e), 418(c)-(d) (1975).
73. Id. § 158(e).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. §§ 300(b)-(c). The requirement that all of the shareholders of the close
corporation be parties to the agreement is found in the definition of shareholder agree-
ment contained in section 186 of the bill. Id. § 186.
77. Id. §§ 300(b), 418.
78. Id. § 300(d).
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A second benefit of close corporation status is that pursuant to sec-
tion 706(a) shareholders of a close corporation may enter into agree-
ments concerning the voting of their shares which may last for the dura-
tion of the close corporation's existence.79 These agreements may specify
how shares are to be voted, or they may provide procedures for making
that determination at the time of the vote."' Such agreements may in-
volve placing shares in the hands of a third party who is empowered
to vote them."' A voting trust is the most common of such procedures.
Here, too, a transferee of the shares is bound by the terms of the agree-
ment if notice of the agreement is placed on the share certificates.
8 2
Finally, section 300(e) of the bill places a limitation on the appli-
cation of the alter ego doctrine to the shareholders of close corporations
who have entered into shareholder agreements pursuant to section 300
(b).83  Failure to hold meetings of shareholders or directors is not a
ground for holding the shareholders personally liable for the obligations
of the corporation if they were simply proceeding according to their
agreement."4
It is apparent that the thrust of the reforms as they relate to close
corporations is the allowance of greater contractual freedom to the par-
ticipants in a close corporation so that they may shape the structure
of their business without risking illegality. 5 The remainder of this
comment will consider the effectiveness of the California bill in accom-
plishing this purpose.
Shareholder Agreements Relating to Management
of the Corporation
One of the common devices used by shareholders in a close cor-
poration to accomplish their individual purposes is an agreement among
themselves concerning management of the corporation's affairs. These
agreements may include provisions designating certain persons as offi-
cers or employees, 6 specifying the length of the term of employment
79. Id. § 706(a).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. §§ 418(a)(3), (b).
83. Id. § 300(e).
84. ld.
85. This approach follows the suggestion of Professor Bradley that close corpora-
tion statutes should be animated by the principle that the widest possible contractual
freedom is to be allowed participants in close corporations. Bradley, A Comparative
Evaluation, supra note 67, at 525-26.
86. See, e.g., Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937); Seitz v.
Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323,
189 N.E. 234 (1934).
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of those hired,17 fixing the distribution of the profits of the enterprise,88
and setting the policies to be pursued in the day-to-day management
of the business.80 In addition, a veto power may be given certain
shareholders over particular corporate actionY0  Essentially, these
agreements reflect a desire on the part of the shareholders to mold the
corporate structure to satisfy more effectively the needs and expecta-
tions of the parties, whether these needs and expectations concern a
long-term job, a share of the profits not equivalent to capital contribu-
tion, or the avoidance of overreaching by the majority shareholders. a1
Historical Treatment of Shareholder Agreements
Shareholders entering into such agreements in jurisdictions with
traditional corporation statutes have been at the same time naive and
sophisticated-naive in their presumption that the courts would be
friendly to such tampering with the corporate mechanism, and sophisti-
cated in their belief that the observance of certain formalities designed
for the protection of shareholders becomes meaningless when none of
the shareholders want or desire the protections these formalities af-
ford. 2
Historically, the courts found these agreements defective on the
grounds that they usurped the function delegated the board of directors
by the corporation statute and tended to treat the shareholders like
partners instead of like participants in a corporation. The typical cor-
poration statute contains a section similar to the present California pro-
vision, which states broadly: "all corporate powers shall be exercised
by or under authority of, and business and affairs of every corporation
shall be controlled by, the board of directors. '93 In Professor Lattin's
words, the principle embodied in the statute is that "[tihe management
of the modern corporation is almost exclusively in the hands of the
board of directors."9 4  Directors are normally considered more like
principals than like agents in relation to the shareholders.95 The
87. See, e.g., Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 175 So. 642 (1937); Seitz v.
Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921).
88. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hooper, 76 NJ. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910).
89. Id.
90. Cf. Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 NJ. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Ch. 1953).
91. 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.12.
92. Many authorities concur in this belief. See, e.g., 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, §
5.07; Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 1,
43-67 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kessler, New York Law].
93. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1955 & Supp. 1975).
94. LArrTiN, supra note 16, § 69.
95. Id.
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shareholders are traditionally left with little beyond the power to re-
move the directors whose policies displease them.
In the close corporation, where there exists essentially a unity of
the functions of shareholder, director and officer, the results of the ap-
plication of the general theory to the particular facts have been incon-
gruous. In Jackson v. Hooper,9" two people purchased all the stock
of a corporation under an agreement between them that both would
serve as directors along with three other "nominal" directors, but that
the corporation would be managed as a partnership, with the two of
them splitting control and management between themselves. The
New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the agreement declaring that
the parties could not be partners between themselves and a corporation
as to the rest of the world.97 The court added:
The law thus confides the business management of the corporation
to its directors . . . . They represent all of the stockholders and
creditors, and cannot enter into agreements, either among them-
selves or with stockholders, by which they abdicate their indepen-
dent judgment. 98
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Seitz v. MicheP9 emphasized the ir-
relevance of the fact that all of the shareholders had entered an agree-
ment. The court refused to admit evidence of unanimous shareholder
agreement and invalidated an agreement between two partners that
upon incorporation of their partnership one would provide capital while
the other would be guaranteed a lifetime job.
The judicial reluctance to sanction deviations from the corporate
norm with regard to the board of directors eventually gave way. The
courts, first in recognizing "slight and innocuous" departures from the
legal model,100 and later in declaring that the peculiar needs of the
close corporation justified technical violations of the corporation laws, 101
began to accept the validity of shareholder agreements regulating the
management of the corporation if they were not characterized by fraud
or oppression of minority shareholders.0 2 During this period legisla-
tures in a number of jurisdictions, reluctant to leave a matter of such
importance to shifting and uncertain judicial thought, expressly sanc-
96. 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910).
97. Id. at 599, 75 A. at 571.
98. Id. at 603, 75 A. at 573; accord, McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189
N.E. 234 (1934).
99. 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102 (1921).
100. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 415, 417, 199 N.E. 641, 642, 643 (1936).
101. Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 29, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (1964).
102. See, e.g., id. at 32, 203 N.E.2d at 586; Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121,
128, 136 S.E.2d 569, 575 (1964). See also cases cited in 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, §
5.04, but note the author's observation that the courts in some jurisdictions are still un-
willing to sanction these arrangements.
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tioned arrangements between shareholders, even though the parties
treated each other like partners or interfered with the discretion vested
in the board of directors.
10 3
Present California Attitude
California has not expressed itself clearly with respect to these
types of shareholder agreements. The general rule has been stated
and applied that the management function of the corporation rests with
the board, and that this authority cannot be delegated by means of a
shareholder agreement.104 Moreover, in Trumbo v. Bank of Berk-
eley,1 1 the California Court of Appeal indicated that a shareholder
agreement could not include a long-term employment contract for a
prospective officer because such an arrangement would require the
board to relinquish its discretion in selecting officers.
At the same time, however, California has had a provision in its
General Corporation Law since 1931 which allows the articles of in-
corporation to contain provisions not otherwise unlawful for regulating
the business and affairs of the corporation, including the function of
the directors. 06  Nevertheless, no cited case has invoked this section
in considering shareholder agreements regulating the board's function,
and little information exists as to how it has been used to incorporate
shareholder agreements into the articles. Given the provision's qualifi-
cation that the agreement be not otherwise unlawful, the statute is
probably of little value, since any agreement could still be attacked on
grounds sustainable at common law.1'0
The California Bill
Section 300(b) of the California bill allows the shareholders of
a close corporaton to enter an agreement regulating the affairs of the
corporation including its management, division of its profits, and dis-
tribution of its assets on liquidation. 10 8 Such an agreement would be
invulnerable to attack on the ground that it interfered with the discre-
ton of the board or treated the corporation like a partnership or the
shareholders like partners.0 9 Section 300(c) states that all provisions
103. See statutes cited in 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 5.07(a).
104. See, e.g., Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 171,
260 P.2d 823, 831 (1953); Smith v. California Thorn Cordage, 129 Cal. App. 93, 98,
18 P.2d 393, 395 (1933).
105. 77 Cal. App. 2d 704, 709, 176 P.2d 376, 379 (1947).
106. Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 862, § 290(7)(c), at 767 (now CAL. CoRnP. CODE § 305(c)
(West 1955) ).
107. 1 BALLANT N & SToiNG, supra note 35, § 38.
108. A.B. 376 § 300(b) (1975).
109. Id.
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of the General Corporation Law may be altered or waived by the share-
holder agreement except the following: the sections relating to elec-
tion, revocation, and involuntary loss of close corporation status; the
sections regulating dividends and distributions to the shareholders; the
sections governing certain votes to be taken by the shareholders of
close corporations in connection with mergers and reorganizations; and
the chapters relating to corporate records and reports, shareholder in-
spection of such records, the right to bring an action for involuntary
dissolution of the corporation, and criminal penalties.11
Section 300(b) is based on a North Carolina statute,"' and sec-
tion 300(c) is entirely new. A consideration of the history of the
North Carolina statute as well as its judicial treatment is helpful in un-
derstanding the thrust as well as the limitations of section 300(b), and
also indicates why section 300(c) was included in the proposal as a
supplement to 300(b).
The North Carolina Statute
The North Carolina statute defines a close corporation as one
whose shares are not publicly traded, and it provides that unanimous
agreements among the shareholders of such close corporations are not
subject to attack on the ground that they treat the corporation like a
partnership or the shareholders like partners.12  In addition, all or less
than all the shareholders of any corporation as well as nonshareholders
may enter into agreements which cannot be invalidated on the basis
that they interfere with the discretion of the board. 3
While the language of the North Carolina statute is clearly di-
rected at correcting the mistaken views of the courts that led to the
statute's enactment, this approach causes the statute to suffer from a
certain amount of shortsightedness. Under the statute shareholder
agreements are free from attack on the same three grounds enume-
rated in the California measure. Nonetheless, what is to prevent an
ingenious attorney from inventing other grounds on which to attack
such an agreement? For example, he could allege that the agreement
eliminated the board of directors rather than just interfered with its dis-
cretion,1 14 or that its provisions constituted an unreasonable restraint
110. Id. § 300(c).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(c) (1975).
112. Id. § 55-73(b).
113. Id. § 55-73(c). The original draft of the California proposal permitted less
than unanimous shareholder agreements interfering with the board's discretion in close
corporations. See 1 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA COMMriTEE ON CORPORATIONS, Ex-
PosumE DRAFT: GENERAL CORPORATION LAw § 300(b) (1974). Later revisions allowed
such agreements only if unanimous shareholder assent to them was obtained. See A.B.
376 § 300(b) (1975).
114. Professor Kessler indicates that a shareholder agreement could not eliminate
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on the alienation of property" 5 or conflicted with a statutory guarantee
of cumulative voting in the election of directors.
Professor Latty perhaps anticipated this criticism, and in a com-
ment made shortly after the statute's enactment, he indicated that the
essential purpose of the statute was to "set a friendly tone for incorpo-
rated partnership arrangements." 116 He went on to point out that the
statute was phrased in the negative to allow greater judicial freedom
and flexibility, and that its essential thrust was to make clear that no
agreement between shareholders should be held invalid merely be-
cause it treated the corporation like a partnership." 7 He did admit,
however, that "[a] court may pronounce [an agreement] bad for other
reasons, although it would presumably have to be something pretty
serious since it was agreed to.by everyone."
8
In a case dealing with the same statute, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court failed to show an attitude toward close corporations as
friendly as Professor Latty might have hoped. In Stein v. Capital Out-
door Advertising, Inc.,19 the court considered an agreement between
two of three shareholders of a corporation under which one allowed
the other to vote his stock. The shareholder given the vote attempted
to use this power to oust the other two shareholders from the board
of directors. Perhaps influenced by the overreaching of the shareholder
who was given the vote of the shares, the court threaded its way cau-
tiously through the liberalizing provisions of the North Carolina Busi-
ness Corporations Act and finally found the agreement to be a proxy
which had expired, since under North Carolina law, a proxy could be
granted for a maximum of eleven months.1 0 In particular the court
rejected the argument that the agreement should be upheld under the
North Carolina provision protecting less than unanimous shareholder
agreements from attack on the ground that they interfered with the dis-
cretion of the board.' 2  Rather than recognizing a penumbra sur-
rounding the statute in favor of close corporation agreements, the court
simply stated that the statute could not uphold the agreement because
the board under a similar New York statutory pattern. See Kessler, New York Law,
supra note 92, at 49.
115. For a discussion of how a shareholder agreement under section 300(b) might
permissibly extend to share transfer restrictions and thus raise problems of restraint on
alienation, see notes 165-191 & accompanying text infra.
116. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corpo-
rations Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 438 (1956).
117. --d.-at 439. .
118. Id.
119. 273 N.C. 77, 159 S.E.2d 351 (1968).
120. Id. at 84, 159 S.E.2d at 356.
121. Id.
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the agreement did not by its terms infringe on the discretion of the
board, and "all that [section] 55-73(c) does is to remove an agree-
ment between stockholders from that specific objection to its valid-ity.,,122
The case indicates that the flexibility placed in the North Carolina
statutes gives a court the freedom to interpret the statutory reprieve
in very narrow terms. Furthermore, this result suggests once more the
possibility that grounds not stated in the statute could be used to over-
throw a shareholder agreement.
Section 300(b): Its Scope and Limitations
Section 300(b) of the bill, having been drawn in large part from
this North Carolina statute, suffers from a similar lack of precision.
Thus, from its terms, it is likewise unclear how far a shareholder agree-
ment may go in restructuring the corporation. It, too, is phrased in the
negative, stating on what grounds shareholder agreements cannot be
attacked .'2  As in the case of the North Carolina statute, it does not
positively endorse the legality in all circumstances of any type of close
corporation shareholder agreement. Therefore, the courts are free to
interpret the statute as sanctioning virtually all close corporation agree-
ments, perhaps with an exception for agreements procured by fraud,
or to interpret it as simply providing a limited protection for share-
holder agreements, upholding them only in those cases in which the
attack is explicitly proscribed by the statute.
As indicated above, section 300(b) does explicitly bring within
the scope of its uncertain protection three types of shareholder agree-
ments. The first type, that relating to the management of the affairs
of the corporation, is so inclusive that it provides no further guidance
beyond the general terms of 300(b) as to what is a permissible share-
holder agreement. 2 ' The second type, agreements relating to the di-
vision of profits, is limited by the express qualification in section 300
(c) that a shareholder agreement under section 300(b) may not alter
the provisions of the new General Corporation Law regulating divi-
dends and other distributions to the shareholders. 25 Thus, this type
of agreement seems to be limited to one providing that dividends law-
fully declared be distributed on a basis other than the number of shares
held by each particular shareholder. Since such a disproportionate di-
vision of profits can presently be accomplished by artful use of pre-
122. Id.
123. A.B. 376 § 300(b) (1975).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 300(c), 500, 501.
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ferred and common shares, the proposal appears merely to allow a
simpler and more direct means to such distribution within a close cor-
poration without adding much to the substantive rights of close corpora-
tion shareholders.
Finally, section 300(b) refers to agreements concerning the distri-
bution of the assets of the corporation on liquidation. 2 ' Narrowly
read, this provision could be viewed as nothing more than a codification
of existing case law relating to the establishment of preferences on
liquidation. 2 7 More broadly read, however, it could be viewed as pro-
viding explicit authorization for agreements relating to the liquidation
of the corporation which would allow one or more shareholders to elect
to dissolve the corporation regardless of whether or not they held fifty
percent or more of the voting power of the corporation as required by
section 1900 of the bill.128 In any event, this reference, as well as the
other two explicit references within 300(b), must be read against the
uncertain backdrop of 300(b) as a whole, which validates close corpo-
ration shareholder agreements only in an indirect, negative manner.
Section 300(c) and its Relation to Section 300(b)
Section 300(c) attempts to remedy the defects in 300(b) by artic-
ulating a broad based affirmation of the contractual freedom of share-
holders party to a 300(b) agreement. 29  Nevertheless, the sentence
in 300(c) declaring that all of the provisions of the General Corpora-
tion Law other than those specifically mentioned in 300(c) can be al-
tered or waived was an amendment to the bill as originally submitted
and fails to blend with the other parts of section 300.1- °
For example, section 300(b) is an express qualification of sec-
tion 300(a), which states that the corporation is to be managed by the
board.' 3 ' Section 300(b) upholds a unanimous shareholder agree-
ment which interferes with the managerial discreton of the board of
directors. Standing alone, section 300(b) seems to contemplate a
board whose function may be limited, but not eliminated, by a share-
holder agreement.'82 In light of this express treatment of the relation
126. Id. § 300(b).
127. For a discussion of shareholder agreements relating to liquidation of the cor-
poration under present California law see Comment, Rights of Minority Shareholders
to Dissolve a Closely Held Corporation, 43 CALI. L. REv. 514 (1955).
128. Section 1900 governs the election by the shareholders to voluntarily dissolve
their corporation. A.B. 376 § 1900 (1975).
129. Id. § 300(c).
130. Parts of A.B. 376, including section 300(c), were amended in the California
Assembly on April 1, 1975.
131. A.B. 376 §§ 300(a)-(b) (1975).
132. It is not entirely clear that the board could not be abolished by an agreement
November 1975] CALIFORNIA CLOSE CORPORATIONS
between shareholder agreement and board in 300(b), it remains open
to question whether or not 300(c) could be interpreted to allow com-
plete abolition of the board. This conclusion finds support in the fact
that an agreement under 300(c) can waive the provisions of the Corpo-
ration Law only if it qualifies under 300(b).
33
An inspection of section 300(d) indicates further limitations on
section 300(c). Section 300(d) shifts liability to the shareholders who
are parties to a 300(b) agreement to the extent the directors are re-
lieved of their responsibilities. 3 It seems improbable that by virtue
of 300(c) the shareholders could eliminate the liability imposed upon
them by 300(d) and leave such liability imposed on a group of dummy
directors who could then disclaim responsibility because they were
powerless to act by reason of the shareholder agreement. Neverthe-
less, the express terms of 300(c) would seem to allow the shareholders
to take this action.
Finally, it seems that it would be impossible for shareholders to
use section 300(c) to alter section 300(e) at all. Section 300(e) pro-
vides a limited statutory reprieve from the application of the judicially
developed alter ego doctrine. 13 5 Since 300(c) allows the alteration or
waiver only of statutes and not of case law, any tinkering with 300(e)
could only mean a less extensive reprieve than the section would other-
wise allow.
Thus, the broad and ill-defined grant of 300(c) has introduced
ambiguities even within the narrow context of section 300. Even greater
uncertainty is likely to attend the application of 300(c) to the corpo-
ration law as a whole, and it remains problematic whether or not a court
would be willing to allow a shareholder agreement to eliminate such
controversial provisions of the new General Corporation Law as those
limiting indemnification of the board of directors by the corporation, 3 '
those providing for the rights of dissenters concerning fundamental
under A.B. 376 section 300(b). The language of the statute is equivocal, however, and
since it would have been simple enough to state that the board could be abolished, the
absence of such permission indicates at least a legislative disinclination toward such ab-
olition. Professor Bradley indicates that similar equivocal language in a South Carolina
statute was intended to discourage shareholders from abolishing the board. Bradley, To-
ward a More Perfect Close Corporation, supra note 3, at 1178-80. Professor Kessler
states that a New York statute allowing agreements which interfere with the discretion
of the board does not allow abolition of the board. See Kessler, New York Law, supra
note 92, at 49.
133. A.B. 376 § 300(c) (1975).
134. Id. § 300(d).
135. Id. § 300(e). See also notes 244-49 & accompanying text infra.
136. A.B. 376 § 317 (1975).
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corporate action,' and those relating to interested directors' dealings
with the corporation.138
Moreover, despite its freewheeling approach, section 300(c) fails
to give sanction to one of the most meaningful elements of a close cor-
poration agreement, the stock transfer restriction. Since, as will be dis-
cussed below, the legal difficulties of stock transfer restrictions arose
from common law hostilities to restraints on the alienation of prop-
erty, 3 ' allowing shareholder agreements to waive or alter provisions
of the General Corporation Law in no way removes the legal impedi-
ments to stock transfer restrictions.
It is disappointing that the California proposal, while recognizing
the important right of shareholders in a close corporation to fashion the
structure of the corporation according to their unanimous agreement,
is not more explicit in dealing with the validity and scope of such agree-
ments. Maryland provides an interesting counterbalance. The Mary-
land statute dealing with shareholder agreements in a close corporation
specifically enumerates the areas to which the agreement may extend,
and also makes clear that the board of directors can be abolished. 140
Similarly, Rhode Island's statute, though by no means as clear as Mary-
land's, states explicitly that the agreement may abolish the board of
directors.' 4 '
Share Transfer Restrictions
Purposes and Kinds of Share Transfer Restrictions
A common desire of participants in a close corporation is that the
business entity have the characteristic of delectus personarum com-
monly associated with partnerships; that is, that the associates in the
business have the power to choose those with whom they will work and
to exclude those with whom they do not wish to work.'42 Stock trans-
fer restrictions are common devices to this end. 43  Limitations on the
manner in which the stock can pass from the hands of the original par-
ticipants help both to preserve the original membership and form of
the organization and, if that membership and form are to change, to
give the remaining participants a voice in determining to whom the
137. Id. § 1300-12.
138. Id. § 310.
139. See notes 148-51 & accompanying text infra.
140. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 103, 104 (1967).
141. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-1.1-51 (1969).
142. 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.12; Kessler, Partnership Corporation, supra note
34, at 256.
143. Professor O'Neal estimates that one-half of the corporations in the United
States have placed transfer restrictions on their shares. 2 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 7.03
at 6 n.5.
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shares will be transferred.' Share transfer restrictions can take any
of the following forms:
1 ) an absolute prohibition on the transfer of stock;
2) a consent restriction requiring that the holder of the shares
obtain the consent of the corporation or other shareholders before
he can sell his stock;
3) a right of first refusal, by which the corporation or one or
more of its shareholders must be offered the stock, and must be
given the opportunity to buy it, before a sale to outsiders is per-
mitted; or
4) a buy-out agreement, which imposes an obligation on the
corporation or its shareholders to purchase the stock, and on its
holder to sell it, on the occurrence of a stated event or contingen-
cy, commonly death of the holder or his retirement from the
business.' 45
As Professor O'Neal indicates, this catalogue of restrictions is
somewhat misleading, for differing aspects of the four common types of
transfer restrictions actually allow for an infinite variety of restric-
tions. 46 The enumerated types do, however, form the parameters
within which most restrictions could conceivably be drawn. 47
Judicial Treatment of Share Transfer Restrictions
Given the hostility of American courts to restraints on the aliena-
tion of property, absolute prohibitions on the transfer of stock have
rarely been attempted in the United States, and the courts have made
clear that they will consistently invalidate any such provisions.'48 Con-
144. See Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 391 P.2d 828, 830,
38 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350 (1964); 12 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5461.1 (rev. ed. 1971); 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.12; Bradley, Stock
Transfer Restrictions and Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.R. 139 [hereinafter cited
as Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions]. Another advantage of such restrictions is that
they enable the corporation to qualify for exemptions from registration under federal and
state securities laws. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 3, 4, 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d
(1970); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h) (West Supp. 1975).
145. 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING, supra note 35, at § 46; 12 W. FLETCHER, CYCLO-
PEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5461.1 (rev. ed. 1971); 2 O'NEAL, supra
note 3, § 7.05.
146. 2 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 7.05.
147. See Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions, supra note 144, at 140-42.
148. See Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 542, 141 N.E.2d 812, 816,
161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 423 (1957) (dictum); Farmer's Mercantile & Supply Co. v. Laun,
146 Wisc. 252, 256, 131 N.W. 366, 368 (1911) (dictum); 2 O'NEAL, supra note 3,
§ 7.06; Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159, 1165 (1930). But
see Carpenter v. Dummit, 221 Ky. 67, 297 S.W. 695 (1927).
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sent provisions have fared poorly for the same reason.149 While some
courts have upheld them as reasonable restraints, others have disal-
lowed them, contending that they place unbridled power in the hands
of the party whose consent is required.5 0 Thus, rights of first refusal,
buy and sell agreements, and modified prohibitions limiting the class
to whom the stock may be transferred have been the common means
for placing restraints on the transfer of stock.151
Stock Transfer Restrictions Under California Law
The present California Corporations Code provides that reason-
able restrictions on the transfer of stock may be embodied in the bylaws
of the corporation. 52 The new law modifies this permission slightly
by allowing such restrictions to be placed in either the articles or the
bylaws. 5
3
In interpreting the present statute, the California Supreme Court
in Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins 54 held that the provision which
requires that a bylaw imposing a transfer restriction be reasonable sug-
gests a two-fold test: 1) that the bylaw must not constitute an unrea-
sonably restrictive curtailment of the right of alienation; and 2) that
it must not otherwise unreasonably deprive the shareholder of substan-
tial rights.
55
The restraint imposed on the shareholder in Tu-Vu required that
before selling her stock she offer it to the corporation at the price at
which she planned to sell it. The court balanced the interests of the
corporation against those of the shareholder to determine the reason-
ableness of the restriction under the test. Given the mildness of the
restraint and the fact that such restrictions were often essential to the
corporation in preventing unwanted intrusion by outsiders, as well as
in preserving the integrity of the entity, the court found the restriction
149. See Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions, supra note 144, at 140-42; Painter,
Stock Transfer Restrictions: Continuing Uncertainties and A Legislative Proposal, 6
VmL. L. R-v. 48 (1960).
150. See, e.g., Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (1949) (invalid);
Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Mach. Co., 81 NJ. Eq. 256, 86 A. 1026 (1913) (invalid);
Rafe v. Hindin, 23 N.Y.2d 759, 296 N.Y.S.2d 955, 244 N.E.2d 469 (1968) (invalid).
But see, e.g., Schaffer v. Below, 278 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1960) (valid); Carlson v. Ringold
County Mut. Tel. Co., 252 Iowa 748, 108 N.W.2d 478 (1961) (valid); Barrett v. King,
181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902) (valid).
151. See 2 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 7.05; Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions, supra
note 144, at 140-41.
152. CAL. CoRP. CoDn § 501(g) (West 1955).
153. A.B. 376 §§ 204(b), 212(b) (1) (1975).
154. 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d 828, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964).
155. Id. at 286, 391 P.2d at 830, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
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reasonable. 50 In dictum in a later case, Justice Traynor summarized
the grounds for finding the restriction reasonable in Tu-Vu: "A cor-
poration can restrict the transfer of its shares because of the interest
of the shareholders in the persons with whom they are in business."'
151
The holding in Tu-Vu must not be read too broadly, however.
While the decision appears to give broad sanction to stock transfer re-
strictions which enable the participants in a close corporation to deter-
mine with whom they will work, the court carefully considered the par-
ticular type of restriction imposed and emphasized that under the
agreement in Tu-Vu, the shareholder was merely required to make a
first offer to the corporation and its shareholders; she did not have to
accept anything less from them than the price she planned to ask of
outsiders."
In short, California appears to be no friendlier to share transfer
restrictions than are most other jurisdictions. Despite the concern of
the court in Tu-Vu for the needs of the close corporation, and the will-
ingness suggested in other recent decisions to uphold rights of first re-
fusal,"5 9 the California courts have not explicitly upheld absolute trans-
fer prohibitions or consent restraints, and thus close corporation partici-
pants remain in doubt as to the legality of restrictions more stringent
than rights of first refusal. This uncertainty persists despite the fact
that consent restraints and absolute transfer prohibitions are probably
the most effective tools for close corporations desiring to restrict their
membership.
Part of the problem is that the courts have been presented with
156. Id. at 287, 391 P.2d at 830, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 350. The restraining bylaw
the court upheld as reasonable was passed after the complaining shareholder acquired
her shares. To the extent that the court permitted the bylaw to apply retroactively
against the shares outstanding without the consent of the holders, the case is legislatively
overruled by sections 204 and 212 of the new law, which provide that restrictions on
transfer contained in the articles or bylaws shall not be binding "with respect to shares
issued prior to the adoption of the restriction unless the holders of such shares voted
in favor of the restriction." A.B. 376 §§ 204(b), 212(b)(1). The court's standard of
reasonableness for judging the validity of bylaws restricting transfer is not overruled by
the new law, however, since that standard has been applied to such bylaws irrespective
of whether or not they operated retroactively. For cases discussing the applicability of
the standard to prospectively applied bylaws, see Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
49 Cal. App. 3d 415, 122 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975); Sanchez v. Centro Mexicano, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 756, 81 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1969).
157. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 508 (1964).
158. Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 391 P.2d 828, 830,
38 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350 (1964).
159. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Centro Mexicano, I Cal. App. 3d 756, 81 Cal. Rptr. 875
(1969) (right of first refusal held valid); Casady v. Modern Metal Spinning & Mfg. Co.,
188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 10 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1961) (right of first refusal held valid).
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a statute which in upholding "reasonable" restraints fails to distinguish
between closely held and public corporations. Thus, the courts may
be reluctant to venture too far in allowing members of close corpora-
tions to impose such restraints for fear that this result would present
an opportunity for mischief by those in control of publicly held corpora-
tions. A more realistic explanation"'0 may be that the courts are
simply unwilling to view the statute as a close corporation statute absent
a clearer indication of legislative intent supporting such an interpreta-
tion.
The California Bill
Three parts of the California bill potentially relate to the problems
of share transfer restrictions and the close corporation. Section 204(b)
allows the articles of the corporation to set forth reasonable restrictions
on the transfer of stock.' 61 This provision is drawn verbatim from the
old statute except that the new law adds that such a provision cannot
be given retroactive effect over shares already issued unless those hold-
ing the shares voted for the restriction, and that the articles as well as
the bylaws may contain such restrictions.' The enactment of this sec-
tion thus merely incorporates into the new General Corporation Law
the problems left unresolved by the old statute, since the section does
not affect the uncertain availability of consent and absolute prohibition
restraints and fails to distinguish between close and public corpora-
tions.'0
3
The second aspect of the bill which may assist the participants in
a close corporation in their attempts to restrict transfers is its specifica-
tion that a close corporation's articles must limit the corporation to ten
or fewer shareholders and that a transfer is void that would result in
the corporation having more shareholders than the number stated in
the articles. 4 While the outer limit set by the articles may help to
160. That the first explanation may not be realistic is demonstrated by the fact that
almost all the appellate cases in which the courts have dealt with share transfer restric-
tions have involved corporations that would qualify as close corporations under the pro-
posal. See, e.g., Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d 828, 38
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964) (three shareholders in corporation); Vanucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal.
138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932) (five shareholders in corporation); Casady v. Modem Metal
Spinning & Mfg. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 728, 10 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1961) (three sharehold-
ers in corporation). But see Sanchez v. Centro Mexicano, 1 Cal. App. 3d 756, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 875 (1969) (stock apparently widely held).
161. A.B. 376 § 204(b) (1975).
162. Id.
163. See notes 152-60 & accompanying text supra.
164. A.B. 376 §§ 158(a), 418(c)-(d) (1975).
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ensure the size corporation the shareholders desire, the thrust of the
statute is more clearly aimed at serving the legislative policy of restrict-
ing the benefits of close corporation status to small businesses, since
within the limit set by the articles the shares are freely transferable.
Thus, while the number of shareholders in the corporation could be
limited by means of the statement in the articles, the desire of the par-
ticipants to choose those with whom they work would be only partially
met.
Application of Section 300(b)
The third and final aspect of the bill that may relate to stock trans-
fer restrictions is section 300(b), which authorizes unanimous share-
holder agreements in close corporations. 1 5 If it applies to share trans-
fer restrictions, 300(b) would relate only to restrictions within close
corporations and would not burden the courts with the problems such
restrictions might pose within publicly held corporations. Further-
more, application of 300(b) to share transfer restrictions would com-
port with the apparent policy of the statute to promote contractual free-
dom among the participants in a close corporation.
The initial stumbling block in applying 300(b) to agreements to
restrict the transfer of stock is that the section does not by its terms
explicitly extend to such agreements. Moreover, the section is located
in the part of the new General Corporation Law dealing with the board
of directors and its function in the corporation. Thus, it is perhaps
more consistent with this positioning to conclude that while 300(b)
states that agreements among all shareholders of a close corporation
may relate to "any phase of the affairs of a close corporation," it is
essentially concerned with allowing alternative arrangements for the
day to day operation of the close corporation and fails to sanction agree-
ments such as stock transfer restrictions, which relate to the structure
within which management operates and the ownership interests in the
corporation.'66
The section's enumeration of the "affairs" to which such an agree-
ment may extend, however, belies this result. The agreement can re-
late not only to management of the business and division of its profits,
but also to "distribution of its assets on liquidation."'16 7 Liquidation
165. Id. § 300(b).
166. Professor Latty, in his analysis of the North Carolina statute upon which sec-
tion 300(b) of the California proposal is based made clear that he felt the statute did
not extend to include agreements to restrict the transfer of stock. See Latty, The Close
Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REV.
432, 450 (1956).
167. A.B. 376 § 300(b) (1975).
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agreements involve structural changes in the corporation and affect its
continuity. They have little to do with the day to day operation of the
business and are particularly unrelated to the ordinary function of the
board of directors. A restrictive interpretation of 300(b) which would
limit it to agreements relating to the management activities of the board
is therefore inappropriate and, by analogy to liquidation agreements,
agreements restricting the transfer of stock could easily be included
within the scope of 300(b).
Protection 300(b) Could Afford
If 300(b) does apply to share transfer restriction agreements,
a further question arises concerning the degree of protection which the
provision would afford such agreements. As discussed above, section
300(b) protects a shareholder agreement formed pursuant to its terms
from attack on the ground that the agreement treats the corporation as
if it were a partnership or interferes with the discretion of the board
of directors. Presumably, to the extent that it contained a stock
transfer restriction, an agreement could still be attacked on the ground
that it constituted an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of prop-
erty. This vulnerability could in turn mean that stock transfer restric-
tions imposed pursuant to 300(b) would receive no different treatment
than that afforded bylaws restricting transfer under present general cor-
poration law."0 9
If 300(b) is viewed more liberally, however, it can be said that
stock transfer restrictions amount to treating the corporation like a part-
nership, since such agreements can give shareholders a voice in the
admission of new participants, a power always possessed by partners.170
If this interpretation of section 300(b) is accepted, the section could
be viewed as giving blanket authorization to any restriction, no matter
how severe, since the essence of the partnership arrangement is that
no partner is free to transfer his right to participate in the partnership
simply by his own independent action and that partners are always free
to agree that their interests cannot be transferred.17 1 This interpreta-
tion may go too far, however, and may read into the statute more than
it was intended to provide.
168. See notes 108-41 & accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 148-60 & accompanying text supra.
170. See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSmp § 42, at 239 (1968).
While a partner is free to assign his interest at any time, absent a contrary agreement
among the partners, his assignee will not become a partner without the consent of the
other partners. The assignee will, however, succeed to the assigning partner's share of
the profits and of any surplus remaining on dissolution. Id.
171. Id.
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A position midway between those explained above is that section
300(b) indicates, in general, an intent by the legislature to allow the
participants in close corporations greater freedom than presently exists
in fashioning the business form within which they will work. In line
with this interpretation, the statute should be viewed as authorizing
more severe share transfer restrictions in 300(b) shareholder agree-
ments than are allowed in the articles or bylaws of a non-close corpora-
tion, though perhaps less severe restrictions than those permitted in a
partnership. Thus, even though a restriction might be unenforceable
as too restrictive if placed in the articles or bylaws, it could be upheld
under 300(b) as a contract between the close corporation participants.
This interpretation of 300(b) would correspond to the recognition
in an old line of California cases that a transfer restriction invalid as
a bylaw because it placed an unreasonable restraint on alienation could
still be enforced between the parties as a contract. 7 2  Presumably the
distinction drawn in these cases derives from English law, which early
emphasized the contractual nature of the constitution of the corpora-
tionY.13  If this reasoning is followed, once a contract restricting trans-
fer is found to exist, restraints contained therein are imposed on those
who knowingly assent to its terms, even though the restraint as a bylaw
is unenforceable.1
4
Vanucci v. Pedrini'7 5 offers the clearest exposition of this rule. In
that case, the California Supreme Court faced a bylaw giving a right
of first refusal to both the corporation and its shareholders to purchase
at book value the stock held by the defendant, if at any time he decided
to sell it to an outsider. Three previous appellate decisions had con-
sidered the validity of similar share transfer restrictions imposed by the
bylaws of one California corporation.'76 In each case, the court held
the bylaw invalid, the final time because the transferee had not re-
172. See Vanucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932); Smith v. San Fran-
cisco & N. Pac. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 605, 47 P. 582, 589 (1897); Oakland Scavenger Co.
v. Gandi, 51 Cal. App. 2d 69, 81, 124 P.2d 143, 150 (1942); Bodkin v. Silveira, 49
Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 120 P.2d 910, 912 (1942). But see Scott v. Lee, 208 Cal. App. 2d
12, 24 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1962).
173. See Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1376-78 (1956); Note, Corporations-Close Corporate Share-
holder's Right to Transfer Shares May Be Restricted Without His Consent, Tu-Vu Drive-
In Corp. v. Ashkins (Cal. 1964), 53 CALIF. L. REV. 692 (1965).
174. See Vanucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932); Smith v. San Fran-
cisco & N. Pac. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 605, 47 P. 582, 589 (1897); Oakland Scavenger Co.
v. Gandi, 51 Cal. App. 2d 69, 81, 124 P.2d 143, 150 (1942); Bodkin v. Silveira, 49
Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 120 P.2d 910, 912 (1942).
175. 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932).
176. Mancini v. Patrizi, 110 Cal. App. 42, 293 P. 828 (1930); Mancini v. Patrizi,
87 Cal. App. 435, 262 P. 375 (1927); Mancini v. Setaro, 69 Cal. App. 748, 232 P. 495
(1924).
TIM HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
CALIFORNIA CLOSE CORPORATIONS
ceived notice of the bylaw. In attempting to distinguish these previous
cases from the one before it, the court emphasized that the party who
had attempted to purchase the stock had had full notice of its terms,
and that the bylaw, even if unenforceable against a non-assenting
shareholder, could be interpreted as a contract binding on all those who
assented to its terms. The party attempting to purchase the stock was
held to have manifested her agreement to the restriction by taking the
stock with notice of the restriction.
177
Today, such a mild restriction would probably be enforced as a
valid bylaw. 78  The decision is nonetheless instructive, as it reveals
a large residuum of California decisional law which allows contractual
provisions restricting share transfers even though they go considerably
beyond the restrictions which can be contained in a corporation's ar-
ticles or bylaws. Although the early cases are in some respects confus-
ing, they have validated the following restrictions under the contract
theory: a right of first refusal in the corporation and its shareholders,' 7
9
the surrendering by assenting shareholders of the right to make testa-
mentary disposition of their stock, 80 an agreement not to transfer stock
for a period of 5 years unless assent to be bound by a voting agree-
ment was first obtained from the transferee,' 8 ' a restriction requiring
the holder of stock in a bank to pay all indebtedness due the bank before
he could transfer his stock, 8 - and a provision that the shares in a water
company would remain tied to the land served by the company.8 3
These cases suggest that the courts are more willing to uphold
drastic transfer restrictions when the restrictions are contained in con-
tracts rather than provided in bylaws. Section 300(b) involves share-
holder contracts, and if the section extends to contracts restricting
transfer of stock, these cases indicate that greater flexibility should be
allowed as to the types of restraints these agreements may impose than
is allowed for share transfer restrictions contained in bylaws or articles.
Since the benefits of section 300(b) are confined to close corporations,
this interpretation would promote the judicially recognized needs of
close corporation participants without opening the door to abuse by
publicly held corporations. This interpretation of 300(b) would also
177. Vanucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 143, 17 P.2d 706, 708 (1932).
178. See text accompanying notes 151-60 supra.
179. Vanucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932); Bodkin v. Silveira, 49
Cal. App. 2d 1, 120 P.2d 910 (1942).
180. Oakland Scavenger Co. v. Gandi, 51 Cal. App. 2d 69, 81, 124 P.2d 143
(1942).
181. Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 605, 47 P. 582, 589
(1897).
182. Jennings v. Bank of California, 79 Cal. 323, 326-27, 21 P. 852, 853 (1889).
183. Riverside Land Co. v. Jarvis, 174 Cal. 316, 326-27, 163 P. 54, 58 (1917).
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make California close corporation law more compatible with British
law, from which the distinction between permissible bylaws and en-
forceable contracts was originally derived. Under British law, the con-
tractual theory as to stock transfer restrictions has influenced the stat-
utes regulating the forms which businesses may take, with the result
that a company formed under the Private Company Act (the equivalent
of an American close corporation statute) must restrict the transfer of
its shares.184 Similarly, under the contractual theory developed in the
California cases, a greater permissibility regarding such restrictions
could be allowed in the case of unanimous shareholder agreements in
close corporations under section 300(b).
Notice Provisions of Section 300(b)
In addition to possibly allowing more stringent transfer restrictions
than are presently permitted, section 300(b) provides for a system of
constructive notice to prospective purchasers and thereby could make
enforceability of shareholder agreements to restrict transfer much
easier. The California cases indicate some ambivalence as to who, other
than the original parties to a transfer restriction agreement, may pres-
ently be bound by its terms.18 5 It is clear, however, that at least the
party purchasing the stock must have actual knowledge of the restric-
tion to be bound by it.
186
In contrast, 300(b) provides that if the agreement is filed with
the secretary of the corporation for inspection by prospective purchas-
ers of the stock, and if a notation is made on the stock pursuant to
section 418 of the bill that the shares are subject to a shareholder
agreement, a purchaser, even one who does not have actual knowledge
6f the restriction, is bound by the terms of the agreement. 87 A party
who purchases with actual knowledge of the agreement is bound by
184. Companies Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 28(1). See Gower, Some
Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1369,
1377-78 (1956).
185. Compare Vanucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932) (indicating
that a purchaser of the stock is bound by a restriction if he takes with notice of it)
with Jennings v. Bank of California, 79 Cal. 323, 293 P. 852 (1889) (holding a pur-
chaser bound by a restriction only after finding an implied assent to the restriction from
his conduct).
186. See Mancini v. Patrizi, 110 Cal. App. 42, 293 P. 828 (1930).
187. A.B. 376 §§ 300(b), 418(c) (1975). Present California law does not ex-
plicitly provide that an agreement restricting transfer can be made binding on subsequent
purchasers by notation on the stock certificate if the agreement is merely a private con-
tractual arrangement between shareholders and the restriction is not the consequence of
some form of corporate action. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 2404 (West 1955) with
CAL. COMM. CODE § 8204, comment 4 (West 1964).
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it regardless of whether or not a notation of the agreement is made
on the stock. Section 300(b) could furnish a convenient device for
the imposition of more stringent controls upon the transfer of a close
corporation's stock.
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, application of 300(b) to
agreements restricting the transfer of stock raises two problems: it is
not clear that the section was intended to cover such agreements, and
even if it does extend to such agreements, it is not clear that restrictions
embodied in these agreements could be any more strict than those al-
lowed under the general corporation law. The imposition of stock
transfer restriction in a close corporation is normally not an occasion
for inventiveness and imagination. 8" The parties normally want a pro-
vision which will accomplish their purpose and at the same time run
the least risk of being found illegal. Thus it is likely, in light of the
uncertainties surrounding 300(b), that the participants in close corpo-
rations will adhere to -the existing law when they draft stock transfer
restrictions.
Other states' attempts at revision demonstrate that uncertain
coverage of share transfer restrictions is not an inevitable result of a
provision such as 300(b). Rhode Island also follows the North Caro-
lina statute that serves as a basis for California's new section 300(b). 8 9
Nevertheless, that state resolved any ambiguity as to the application of
the section to stock transfer restrictions by adding the stipulation that
an agreement among all the shareholders, whether embodied in the ar-
ticles or not, is not to be held invalid on the ground that it "imposes
too great a restraint on the transfer of the shares of the corporation."'190
Under Rhode Island law, then, any restriction, no matter how absolute,
on the transfer of the shares of a close corporation is valid if it is unani-
mously approved by the shareholders. Delaware and Maryland also
treat stock transfer restrictions more explicitly and could well serve as
models for future provisions in California. 9'
Shareholder Voting Agreements
As discussed earlier, section 300(b) authorizes shareholder
agreements relating to the management of the affairs of the corpora-
tion. 92 Section 706(a) authorizes agreements among the share-
188. See Bradley, Stock Transfer Restrictions, supra note 144, at 149.
189. See R.I. GEN. IAws ANN. § 7-1.1-51 (1969).
190. Id.
191. See DEE.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 104
(1957).
192. See notes 108-41 & accompanying text supra.
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holders as to how they will vote their shares,193 and necessarily overlaps
with the provisions of 300(b) in so far as the voting of shares deter-
mines the management of the affairs of the corporation. Section
706(a), however, has been drafted with greater precision than section
300(b) and thus, in the areas of overlap, may offer a more certain de-
vice than that provided in 300(b) for the participants in a close corpo-
ration to accomplish their purpose. Section 706(a) allows two or more
shareholders in a close corporation to enter into an agreement to vote
their shares according to the agreement.19 4 The agreement may specify
how the shares are to be voted. 195 For example, each year the share-
holders may agree that they will vote for certain people as directors.
On the other hand, they may leave that element to a future decision,'96
and agree, for example, that before any shareholder vote, they will cau-
cus and vote as a unit in accordance with the determination in caucus.
As an alternative, the parties may set up a procedure involving transfer
of the shares to a third party who will vote them according to the terms
of the agreement.' 9 All such agreements under 706(a) extend for
the duration of the existence of the close corporation. 98
Purposes Served by Voting Agreements
A voting agreement can indirectly serve many of the functions that
could potentially be served by a shareholder agreement entered pursu-
ant to section 300(b). It can insure continuity in the board of direc-
tors, the group that will manage the corporation, by requiring the par-
ties to the agreement to vote for certain directors. 199 It can provide
continuity in the fundamental business policies of the corporation by
requiring adherence to a certain pattern of shareholder voting on fun-
damental decisions and can protect minority shareholders by giving
them a veto in shareholder votes. Finally, it can establish a mechanism
for dissolving the corporation, perhaps at the insistence of just one
shareholder."'




197. Id. The proposal also makes clear that a voting agreement valid under sec-
tion 706(a) cannot be declared invalid because it fails to satisfy the requirements of sec-
tion 706(b) relating to voting trusts. Id. § 706(c). This provision may serve as an
explicit rejection in California of any rule that a voting agreement can fall within the
ambit of a voting trust statute and be invalid because it does not comply with the stat-
ute's provisions. The most famous case invalidating a voting agreement on this ground
is Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
198. A.B. 376 § 706(a) (1975).
199. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
200. 'See 2 O'NWAL, supra note 3, § 9.06.
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Historical Treatment of Voting Agreements
As with other devices used by shareholders to vary the structure
of their corporations, the voting agreement in its early application was
subjected to continuing attack by the courts. They offered the follow-
ing reasons for invalidating such agreements: the participants in a cor-
poration could not use these devices to treat each other like partners,201
these agreements impermissibly separated voting power from owner-
ship of stock,2 °2 the shareholders by entering these agreements had ab-
dicated their duty to vote in elections and use their best judgment to
run the corporation, 2 0 and it was impermissible for the corporation to
be run by a minority of its shareholders pursuant to a voting agree-
ment.20 4 With the growing and persistent use of such devices, how-
ever, the courts began to relent, and voting agreements gained greater
judicial acceptance. 205 Nonetheless, the initial hostility continued to
be reflected in cases which invalidated voting agreements on the
ground that they went beyond matters of concern for shareholders and
intruded upon the discretion of the board,2 6 or which found that vot-
ing agreements fell within the ambit of voting trust statutes and were
invalid for failure to comply with statutory requirements. 07
Voting Agreements Under California Law
California never exhibited the intense hostility toward voting
agreements that was demonstrated by some of the other states. In the
1897 case of Smith v. San Francisco and North Pacific Railway Co.,2'8
the California Supreme Court decided in favor of an agreement en-
tered into by three parties who purchased a controlling block of stock in
a railroad and who, following a vote taken among them, agreed to vote
their stock in one group. The court upheld the agreement, reasoning
that since a shareholder could appoint anyone, even a non-shareholder,
201. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
202. Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill.
170, 110 N.E. 373 (1915).
203. Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill.
170, 110 N.E. 373 (1915); Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946);
White v. Thomas Inflatable Tire Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 178, 28 A. 75 (Ch. 1893).
204. Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill.
170, 110 N.E. 373 (1915).
205. See Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936); 1 O'NFAL, supra
note 3, § 5.04.
206. See, e.g., Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y.
174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).
207. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct.
1957); Smith v. Biggs Boiler Works Co., 32 Del. Ch. 147, 82 A.2d 372 (Sup. Ct. 1951);
Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipeline Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 191 A. 823 (Ch. 1937).
208. 115 Cal. 584,47 P. 582 (1897).
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to be his proxy, there was nothing inherently wrong with the separa-
tion of the vote from the ownership of shares.2 09 Furthermore, while
California has long had a statute authorizing voting trusts, 210 the courts
have not felt compelled to construe the statute to invalidate voting
agreements that are close to trusts but do not meet all the statutory
requirements.21'
Despite the apparent willingness of California courts to uphold
voting agreements, the acceptance of such arrangements has not gone
unqualified. In Trumbo v. Bank of Berkeley, 12 the promoter of a new
corporation claimed recovery under a contract he had allegedly entered
into with the corporation's proposed directors. The contract specified
that he was to serve as vice-president of the corporation. The court
did not rule on the legality of the contract, instead allowing the pro-
moter to recover for services rendered, but it did say emphatically that
as to an already existing corporation,
a contract by a director or shareholder .. .whereby it is agreed
that a designated person will be put or maintained in office, or by
which, in any other way, a director attempts to contract away his
discretionary vote on the board of directors is violative of public
policy and is void. 21
3
The decision in Trumbo emphasizes the adherence of California courts
to the view that shareholders by themselves or shareholders serving as
directors cannot enter agreements that infringe upon the functions of
the board of directors or interfere with the discretion exercised by the
board.21 In short, the shareholders can agree as to how they will vote
for members of the board, but they cannot agree as to how those board
members will vote once they assume their positions.
In addition, while the court in Smith v. San Francisco and North
Pacific Railway Co.215 declared that a proxy used to enforce a voting
agreement was coupled with an interest and hence irrevocable simply
on the basis of the mutual promises of the parties,2 16 this holding has
209. Id. at 606, 47 P. at 590.
210. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2230, 2231 (West 1955 & Supp. 1975).
211. See Boericke v. Weise, 68 Cal. App. 2d 407, 156 P.2d 781 (1945) (voting trust
valid even though no stock transferred to trustee); Dougherty v. Cross, 65 Cal. App.
2d 687, 151 P.2d 654 (1944) (agreement invalid as a voting trust valid as a proxy);
Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 245-46.
212. 77 Cal. App. 2d 704, 176 P.2d 376 (1947).
213. Id. at 709, 176 P.2d at 379.
214. See also Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260
P.2d 823 (1953) (the functions of the board cannot be delegated away).
215. 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897).
216. Id. at 599-600, 47 P. at 587. A proxy, since it essentially creates an agency
relationship between the shareholder and the person authorized to vote the shares, can
normally be revoked at will by the shareholder. When, however, the person entitled to
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not been followed with enthusiasm, and it is by no means clear that
irrevocable proxies could today be created so easily. 17 Moreover, in
1965 California amended California Corporations Code section 2231
to make unlimited the right of a majority interest in a voting trust to
terminate the trust at any time.218 Since this amendment further di-
luted the ability of shareholders to compel adherence to voting agree-
ments, it was condemned as a retreat from earlier legislation allowing
binding voting trust arrangements and was criticized as jeopardizing the
legitimate purposes served by voting trusts, namely, providing conti-
nuity of management, aiding in securing debt financing for the corpora-
tion, preventing rival concerns or unwanted individuals from gaining
control of the corporation, and protecting minority shareholders in
shareholder votes.21
The California Bill
The California measure resolves much of the uncertainty concern-
ing the enforceability of voting agreements in close corporations. As
indicated above, the validity of such agreements under the new corpo-
ration law is tested solely against the requirements of section 706(a).
This exclusive treatment of close corporation voting agreements under
section 706(a) lays to rest any lingering doubts that the more stringent
requirements for voting trusts might be applied to invalidate such
agreements.220 Furthermore, section 300(b) indicates that a unani-
mous agreement among the shareholders of a close corporation may
impinge upon the discretion of the board of directors, so that a unani-
mous close corporation voting agreement may safely extend into the
area of corporate management without risking invalidation. 221
vote the shares can show that he took the proxy to protect some proprietary interest
in the shares or the corporation, by demonstrating, for example, that he took them under
an executory contract of sale, or that he is an officer or employee of the corporation,
the proxy has been said to be coupled with an interest and some courts have therefore
held it to be irrevocable by the shareholder. The courts, however, have not been con-
sistent in upholding irrevocable proxies and have left considerable uncertainty about the
dividing line between what constitutes an irrevocable proxy and what does not. See 8
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPoRATIONs § 2062 (rev. ed.
1966); 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 5.36.
217. See Thomsen v. Yankee Mariner Corp., 106 Cal. App. 2d 454, 235 P.2d 234
(1951) (conditional contract of sale not sufficient interest to make proxy irrevocable);
Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 245.
218. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 744, § 1, at 2152 (now CAL. CORP. CODE § 2231 (West
Supp. 1975) ).
219. Comment, The Voting Trust: California Erects a Barrier to a Rational Law
of Corporate Control, 18 STAiN. L. REv. 1210 (1966).
220. See note 197 supra.
221. A.B. 376 § 300(b) (1975).
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Section 706(a) also provides explicit means for the enforcement
of voting agreements. Specific performance is made an accepted
remedy, and the party seeking enforcement is no longer required to
establish equitable grounds for such relief. 2" - The parties may also en-
force agreements by creating proxies irrevocable for the period of the
agreement.223 This provision removes the determination of whether
or not a proxy is irrevocable in the case of a voting agreement from
the uncertain requirement that to be irrevocable, a proxy must be
coupled with an interest. While the revision is not explicit, it seems
clear that arbitration can be another means of enforcing the agree-
ment. A consistent line of New York cases interpreting the statute
upon which this section of the California bill is based has upheld and
enforced agreements to arbitrate. 224  The implication from these cases
is that this statutory provision gives broad approval to arrangements de-
signed to extricate the participants from deadlock and dispute.225
The scope of a voting agreement may also extend to include pro-
visions for dissolution of the corporation. Since section 706(a) allows
agreements among the shareholders relating to any voting rights, there
seems to be no impediment to an agreement among the shareholders
to vote for dissolution upon the happening of a stated event or contin-
gency. Moreover, since section 300(b) explicitly permits unanimous
shareholder agreements relating to the distribution of assets on liquida-
tion, an even stronger basis exists for inferring that 706(a) agreements
approved by all the shareholders could include dissolution provisions.
Finally, 706(a) does not incorporate the 1965 amendment to the Cor-
porations Code, which allowed a majority interest in a voting trust to
terminate the trust at any time
-.22 6
Nevertheless, despite the clarity the bill promises to bring to
shareholder voting agreements, one section raises questions about the
permissible scope of such agreements. The disquieting element is
added by section 706(d), which states "[t]his section shall not in-
validate any voting or other agreement among shareholders or any ir-
revocable proxy complying with subdivision (e) of section 705, which
222. Id. § 706(a). This provision places California in opposition to the decision
in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610,
53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1947) in which the court refused to grant specific performance
of a voting agreement.
223. A.B. 376 §§ 705(e) (5), 706(a) (1975).
224. See, e.g., Crandall v. Master Eagle Photoengraving Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 475,
211 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Application of Astey, 19 Misc. 2d 1059, 189 N.Y.S.
2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1959). The cases are interpreting N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620 (McKin-
ney 1963).
225. See 2 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 9.03; Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 252, 253.
226. See note 218 & accompanying text supra.
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agreement or proxy is not otherwise illegal. ' 227  While the general im-
port of the section is to make clear that its provisions expand the per-
missible areas of agreement among shareholders, and to reject any
theory that agreements previously legal would be invalid because they
fall within the penumbra of the statute yet fail to meet its require-
ments, the provision raises another question: Can agreements within
the terms of section 706 be "otherwise illegal" on the basis of some
other body of law? Section 706(a) states that its provisions allowing
share voting agreements shall be effective "notwithstanding any other
provision of this division. '228  The division is the entire General Cor-
poration Law. Nevertheless, the section makes no mention of invali-
dation under prior case law, which accounted for the failures of most
early attempts at voting agreements.22 9 Perhaps these ghosts have
been put to rest years ago and no one need worry about their resurrec-
tion. It is unfortunate, however, that such care was taken in drafting
section 706(a) only to have section 706(d) raise residual doubts as
to its exclusive application.
The Alter Ego Doctrine
An ample body of case law exists in California concerning the ap-
plication of the alter ego doctrine, under which the shareholders of the
corporation are in certain circumstances held liable for the obligations
of the corporation. 80 In developing the doctrine in California, the
courts have emphasized that the answer to the question of whether
or not to treat the corporation as the alter ego of its shareholders de-
pends on the particular circumstances of the case. 31  Nevertheless, a
227. A.B. 376 § 706(d) (1975).
228. Id. § 706(a).
229. See notes 201-207 & accompanying text supra.
230. As an exception to the general rule that shareholders of a corporation are not
liable for the obligations of the corporation beyond the price they paid for their shares,
there has developed an equitable doctrine, here referred to as the alter ego doctrine, that
the shield from liability provided the shareholders by their corporation will be set aside
if allowing it to remain would be fraudulent, oppressive or unfair. In the case of close
corporations, the courts will commonly take this action if the participants manage the
corporation without separating their affairs from those of the corporation and, by this
confusion of individual and entity, often coupled with an undercapitalization of the cor-
poration, work a fraud or injustice upon an innocent party, usually a creditor. See 1
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDU, OF THE LAW OF PRrvATE CORPORATIONS H8 44-47 (rev. ed.
1974); N. IATriN, supra note 16, H8 14, 18; 1 ONEAL, supra note 3, § 1.09a. See notes
233-45 & accompanying text infra. For an exhaustive review of the California cases
dealing with the alter ego doctrine see Associated Vendors Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co.,
210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1962).
231. See Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d
1 (1957); H.A.S. Loan Service, Inc. v. McColgan, 21 Cal. 2d 518, 133 P.2d 391 (1943);
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general rule has arisen that the corporation will be considered the
alter ego of its shareholders if the following two conditions are met:
1) There is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist.
2) Adherence to the separate existence of the corporation would pro-
mote fraud or injustice or otherwise would lead to an inequitable re-
sult. 2
32
Practices commonly found in cases in which the courts have held
this two-fold test satisfied include:
1) inadequate capitalization of the corporation;
2 33
2) commingling of funds either between a corporation and its
shareholders or between two corporations under common con-
trol;;2
34
3) failure of the corporation to issue stock;
23 5
4) representation by a shareholder in control of a corporation
that he is personally liable for the debts of the corporation; 23 6
5) identity of equitable ownership in two nominally separate
entities ;237
6) use of same office, business equipment, or employees by a
shareholder and the corporation;;
2 38
7) use of the corporation as a mere shell for business of an in-
Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d 390 (1942); Clejan v. Reisman, 5 Cal. App.
3d 224, 84 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
232. See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641
(1961); Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1
(1957); Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 P. 673 (1921); Arnold v. Browne, 27
Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972).
233. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641
(1961); Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1
(1957); Linco Services, Inc. v. Dupont, 239 Cal. App. 2d 841, 49 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1966).
But see Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972); Pearl v.
Shore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 608, 95 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1971); Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App.
3d 837, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1970).
234. See, e.g., Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335 P.2d 107 (1959); Rosen
v. E.C. Losch, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 2d 324, 44 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1965); Talbot v. Fresno
Pac. Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 425, 5 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1960).
235. See, e.g., Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306
P.2d 1 (1957); Wheeler v. Superior Mortgage Co., 196 Cal. App. 2d 822, 17 Cal. Rptr.
291 (1961); Claremont Press Publishing Co. v. Barksdale, 187 Cal. App. 2d 813, 10
Cal. Rptr. 214 (1960).
236. See, e.g., Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d 390 (1942); Shafford v.
Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d 428 (1957).
237. See, e.g., Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335 P.2d 107 (1959); Elliott
v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 373, 77 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1969).
238. See, e.g., McCombs v. Rudman, 197 Cal. App. 2d 46, 17 Cal. Rptr. 351
(1961); Talbot v. Fresno Pac. Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 425, 5 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1960).
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dividual or another corporation;23
8) disregard of legal formalities;240
9) diversion of funds from the corporation to the detriment of
creditors ;
241
10) use of the corporate form as a shield against personal liability
or as subterfuge for illegal transactions;
242
11) contracting with another with the intent to avoid perform-




Section 300(e) of the new General Corporation Law provides
that the failure to observe the corporate formalities of holding director
or shareholder meetings in connection with the management of a close
corporation pursuant to a section 300(b) agreement is no longer to be
considered as evidence that the corporation is the alter ego of its share-
holders or that the shareholders should therefore be personally liable
for the obligations of the corporation.244 Thus, section 300(e) elimi-
nates from the above list informality in the conduct of corporate af-
fairs caused by the failure to hold meetings of the board and share-
holders.245 In view of the length of this list, however, section 300(e)
does not significantly affect the application of the alter ego doctrine
to close corporations.
Moreover, the revision leaves unclear whether or not its allowance
will extend to shareholders who expressly agree among themselves not
to hold such meetings or whether it merely absolves oversight in failing
to hold them because of the fact that the shareholders are running the
business in a manner unlike that in which the normal business corpora-
239. See, e.g., McCombs v. Rudman, 197 Cal. App. 2d 46, 17 Cal. Rptr. 351
(1961); Asamen v. Thompson, 55 Cal. App. 2d 661, 131 P.2d 839 (1942).
240. See, e.g., Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335 P.2d 107 (1959); Mc-
Combs v. Rudman, 197 Cal. App. 2d 46, 17 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1961).
241. See, e.g., Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335 P.2d 107 (1959); Talbot
v. Fresno Pac. Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 425, 5 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1960).
242. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Superior Mortgage Co., 196 Cal. App. 2d 822, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 291 (1961); Claremont Press Publishing Co. v. Barksdale, 187 Cal. App. 2d 813,
10 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1960).
243. See, e.g., Shea v. Leonis, 14 Cal. 2d 666, 96 P.2d 332 (1939).
244. A.B. 376 § 300(e) (1975).
245. For examples of decisions considering the failure to hold meetings of the
board of directors and the shareholders as a ground for treating the corporation as the
alter ego of its shareholders, see Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335 P.2d 107
(1959) (in four year period, only one shareholder meeting and no regular meetings of
the board); Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d 390 (1942) (in four year period,
no meetings of board or shareholders).
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tion is managed. Use of the word "failure" in the proposed section
would seem to indicate the latter result. 4 This interpretation in turn
would indicate that the shareholders could agree on some informality
in the operation of the business, but that the requirement of meetings
of the board of directors and the shareholders could not be deliberately
eliminated without risking application of the alter ego doctrine. This
wording of section 300(e), then, tends to narrow the scope of the
statutory allowance, perhaps in a way that does not comport with the
policy behind the section.
In one sense, the very limited statutory reprieve of 300(e) is un-
derstandable. The courts most often apply the alter ego doctrine to
corporations which could take advantage of the close corporation elec-
tion.247 If shareholders in qualified and electing close corporations
were spared the application of the alter ego doctrine, close corporation
status could become a convenient tool for using the corporate form for
fraudulent ends. On the other hand, as a result of the heavy emphasis
which the doctrine places on the observance of the separate personality
of the corporation, the close corporation may often be forced into the
observance of a rigid formalism totally out of step with practical busi-
ness needs of the corporation in order to avoid the application of the
doctrine. 248  Given the emphasis that the California bill places on al-
lowing the participants of a close corporation to structure informal
working arrangements in keeping with the individual requirements of
their business, it seems advisable for the courts to read section 300(e)
broadly as a legislative mandate directing judicial reformulation of the
alter ego doctrine.249
Need to Reformulate the Alter Ego Doctrine
The case of McCombs v. Rudman250 illustrates well some of the
problems caused by the present formulation of the alter ego doctrine
in the context of close corporations. In McCombs, the sole share-
holder of an incorporated construction company which was formerly
run as a sole proprietorship was held personally liable for a judgment
against the corporation on the grounds that he was operating the cor-
poration as an extension of himself and that it would be fraudulent not
to hold him liable when it was clear that the corporation could not pay
246. A.B. 376 § 300(e) (1975).
247. See notes 230-43 supra & accompanying text.
248. See 1 O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 1.09(a); Tennery, Potential of the Close Cor-
poration: A Question of Economic Validity, 14 How. L.J. 241 (1968).
249. Both Mr. Oppenheim and Professor O'Neal suggest a reformulation of the al-
ter ego doctrine in order to prevent the doctrine from being a device that thwarts in-
creased flexibility in the operation of close corporations. I O'NEnA, supra note 3, § 1.09
(a); Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 231.
250. 197 Cal. App. 2d 46, 17 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1961).
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the judgment.251 To the extent that the court predicated liability on
an assumed inadequate capitalization or other fraudulent manipulation
of the corporate form to deceive outsiders, the result is readily support-
able. Regardless of the correctness of the result, however, the court's
analysis too easily ignores the particular appropriateness of informal
operation in a close corporation.
The court in McCombs found most of its support for applying the
alter ego doctrine in the daily circumstances of the operation of the
corporation. Sam Len, the sole shareholder of the corporation, nego-
tiated the construction contract involved in the case, inspected the work
himself as it progressed, drew a salary from the corporation, and had
no outside job. He had just a single office for himself and the corpo-
ration, he performed almost all the functions of the corporation, and
each day he deposited the corporation's mail in a mailbox.2 52  While
this situation provided an opportunity for misrepresentation by Len of
his personal liability for obligations incurred by the corporation, the fact
that the president of a corporation carries the corporate mail to a mail-
box should not in itself provide the basis for applying the alter ego doc-
trine. In fact, none of the activities of Len described above should
be a ground for applying the doctrine when the policy embodied in
section 300 of promoting informality in close corporations is con-
sidered. Nevertheless, in this case the casual, unstructured approach
taken by the defendant was a crucial element in the finding of liability.
Although something akin to fraud must accompany this type of
casual activity, the court gave the issue of fraud minimal attention in
comparison with its concentration on the way in which Mr. Len con-
ducted his business. The result of a decision such as this one could
be that an attorney will be reluctant to advise his client who has re-
cently incorporated a business to take out the mail himself, or, in gen-
eral, to act in the informal way in which he may have acted before
incorporation.
Despite the fact that the policy of section 300 is clearly at odds
with the view that close corporations must maintain a rigidly formal
structure, the literal language of 300(e) forgives only the failure to
hold board and shareholder meetings. The courts must still decide
whether or not to reformulate the alter ego doctrine, placing more em-
phasis on fraud and less on the manner in which it is perpetrated and
thus allowing flexibility in corporate operations and eliminating the fear
of losing limited liability, or instead to read section 300(e) literally and
perhaps deprive the cautious entrepreneur of the freedom to discard
unwanted conventions.
251. Id. at 51, 52, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 353, 354.
252. Id. at 50, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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Conclusion
It is clear from the preceding discussion of the provisions of the
new California General Corporation Law that California is making a
significant effort to meet the needs of the close corporation.2 53 The
proposal demonstrates this responsiveness by defining the close corpo-
ration, thus recognizing its unique status within the General Corpo-
ration Law, and by making several provisions of the law apply only to
such corporations. The provisions which permit shareholder agree-
ments relating to the management of the corporation 2  and long-term
shareholder voting agreements 25 5 recognize in principle the rights of
participants in close corporations to structure freely the operation of
their business. 256  The limitation which section 300(e) places on the
application of the alter ego doctrine allows some relaxation in the ob-
servance of the corporate formalities by close corporations.2 57
The chief criticism of these provisions is that in general, they tend
to borrow too readily from the law of other jurisdictions without con-
sideration of the practical effect these arrangements will have on the
workings of close corporations. As a result, it is unclear, under section
300(b), how far shareholder management agreements can go in re-
structuring the close corporation and whether or not the statute gives
approval to more severe restriction on the transfer of stock in a close
corporation than is presently permitted. Similarly, section 300(e)
leaves uncertain what degree of informality will be tolerated under the
alter ego doctrine. In contrast, section 706(a), relating to shareholder
voting agreements, is sufficiently precise to indicate that it will give rise
to few interpretive problems. Nevertheless, in large part only the will-
ingness of the partcipants in close corporations to venture into these
new and untried areas, and the receptivity of the courts to such efforts,
will actually determine the full effect of the proposed changes.
Kevin M. Hennessy*
253. See text accompanying notes 43-85 supra.
254. See text accompanying notes 86-141 supra.
255. See text accompanying notes 192-229 supra.
256. These provisions amount to essentially one half of what a model close corpo-
ration statute should contain, according to Professor Bradley. The other half consists
of self-executing statutes which protect minority members of close corporations regard-
less of whether or not the corporation has elected close corporation status or the parties
have'entered agreements relating to the affairs of the corporation. See Bradley, A Com-
parative Evaluation, supra note 67, at 525-26. California has yet to recognize this sec-
ond aspect in its close corporation statutes.
257. See text accompanying notes 230-252 supra.
* J.D., 1975, Hastings College of the Law.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
